ABSTRACT

This article examines the constitutional limitations on Parliament’s power to alter or bifurcate the States of Manipur and Tripura under Article 3 of the Constitution. It argues that while Article 3 grants Parliament wide authority to reorganise States, that power is not absolute and cannot operate in contradiction to the basic structure, federal principles, or Article 363’s explicit bar on judicial scrutiny of disputes arising from pre-constitutional merger covenants. The territorial identity of Manipur and Tripura is not merely historical but a constitutional fact rooted in sovereign merger agreements executed in 1949. These covenants continue to create binding obligations on the Union by virtue of Article 363. This article demonstrates that the reorganisation of Jammu & Kashmir provides no precedent for any alteration of Manipur or Tripura, because the constitutional frameworks governing their accessions are fundamentally distinct. Finally, the article establishes that Parliament cannot legislate or amend in an area from which the Constitution has withdrawn judicial supervision, as such action would create unaccountable, extra-constitutional power and violate the basic structure. The conclusion is clear: the Constitution itself prohibits any unilateral bifurcation or territorial diminution of Manipur or Tripura.

I. INTRODUCTION

The reorganisation of States in India has historically been guided by political necessity, administrative convenience, and the evolving aspirations of regional identities. Article 3 of the Constitution forms the principal mechanism enabling such territorial rearrangement. Yet, this provision operates within the broader constitutional framework—one that integrates the principles of federalism, rule of law, constitutional morality, and historical obligation.

For many States formed through the integration of princely States, especially Manipur and Tripura, the question of territorial integrity cannot be examined solely through the lens of Article 3. Their entry into the Union was not an act of administrative creation but a sovereign political settlement forged through Merger Agreements of 1949, constitutionally protected by Article 363. These instruments created historical, political, and legal obligations that remain binding.

The central argument of this article is simple but critical:

Parliament cannot bifurcate or alter the territories of Manipur or Tripura because such actions violate Article 363, the basic structure, and the constitutional trust embedded in their merger covenants.

II. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ACCESSION

A. Integration of Princely States (1947–1950)

After independence, India faced the monumental task of integrating over 560 princely States. This process occurred through Instruments of Accession and Merger Agreements—each a sovereign compact between two political entities.

B. The Manipur Merger Agreement (1949)

Manipur had a fully functional constitutional monarchy with an elected legislature under the Manipur Constitution Act, 1947. Its accession was based on full sovereignty until 1949. The Merger Agreement of 21 September 1949 therefore dissolved the Manipur State and integrated it as a single political unit into India.

C. The Tripura Merger Agreement (1949)

Tripura similarly merged into the Union under a sovereign covenant executed by its ruler on 9 September 1949, transferring all rights, authority, and jurisdiction associated with the State.

D. The Legal Character of Merger Agreements

Merger covenants were unilateral acts of surrender of sovereignty and bilateral political settlements between equal negotiating authorities.
These were not contracts, but sovereign constitutional acts, later given constitutional recognition through Article 363.

III. CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF MERGER AGREEMENTS

A. Article 363: Scope and Meaning

Article 363 creates a unique constitutional bar:

-- No court shall adjudicate any dispute

-- Arising out of, connected with, or in respect of

-- Pre-Constitution treaties, agreements, covenants, engagements

The merger agreements of Manipur and Tripura fall squarely within this protection.

B. Continuing Relevance

While many personal privileges of rulers were abolished through constitutional amendments, the constitutional foundations of the merger remain intact. Article 363 protects not merely clauses but the entire relationship flowing from such covenants.

C. Federal Trust

Merger agreements created political assurances, forming part of India’s constitutional morality. Their integrity is essential for the legitimacy of the Union.

IV. ARTICLE 3 AND ITS INHERENT STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS

A. Broad Text, Limited Operation

Article 3 enables Parliament to form new States, merge territories, or alter boundaries.
However, it does not grant unregulated authority. Every constitutional power is bounded by other constitutional provisions.

B. Supreme Court Doctrine: No Power Is Absolute

Judgments such as Kesavananda Bharati, I.R. Coelho, and SR Bommai affirm:

Parliament cannot exercise its powers in a manner that destroys the basic structure or violates constitutional obligations.

C. Harmonious Construction

Article 3 must be read with Article 363, not against it. When territorial reorganisation implicates a merger covenant, Article 363 overrides Article 3.

V. BASIC STRUCTURE AND TERRITORIAL IDENTITY

Federalism, judicial review, constitutional morality, and historical continuity of States form part of the basic structure.

A. Federalism as Basic Structure

The identity of States and the distribution of powers are foundational to the Constitution.

B. Judicial Review as Basic Structure

Parliament cannot create unreviewable powers.

C. Identity of Acceding States

The identity of Manipur and Tripura at merger was of whole, indivisible political entities.

D. Territorial Alteration and Basic Structure

Destroying the territorial identity of a State that acceded to India undermines federalism and constitutional morality.

VI. WHY PARLIAMENT CANNOT LEGISLATE IN A FIELD BARRED FROM JUDICIAL REVIEW

A. Article 363 Creates a Constitutional Exclusion Zone

This provision removes certain subject-matters entirely from judicial scrutiny.

B. Constitutional Logic: No Unchecked Legislative Power

If the courts cannot review a matter, Parliament cannot legislate on it, because such legislation becomes unaccountable.

C. Parliament’s Power Must Be Reviewable

Judicial review is essential to constitutionalism. Reorganisation of States like Manipur/Tripura would produce disputes that courts cannot adjudicate—therefore Parliament cannot legislate in that field.

VII. SILENCE IN THE MERGER AGREEMENTS DOES NOT GIVE PARLIAMENT POWER

A. Sovereign Compacts Do Not Require Explicit Prohibitions

Not stating that India “shall not bifurcate” does not imply permission.

B. Territorial Identity Is an Implied Term

The accession was of the entire State, not its fragments.

C. Silence Means Restraint

Constitutional silence is not legislative space—it is caution.

D. Allowing Parliament to Exploit Silence Would Destroy Article 363

This would collapse the entire federal structure.

E. Legal Principle

Silence cannot legitimise constitutional destruction.

VIII. J&K CANNOT BE A PRECEDENT FOR MANIPUR OR TRIPURA

An introductory paragraph explains that drawing analogies with J&K is constitutionally flawed.

A. Different Instruments

J&K acceded under the IoA + Article 370; Manipur/Tripura under Merger Agreements.

B. Article 370 vs. Article 363

J&K had a constitutional mechanism to alter status. Manipur/Tripura have a constitutional prohibition.

C. No Merger Covenant Protection in J&K

Accession of J&K did not involve Article 363.

D. Reorganisation of J&K was judicially reviewable

Reorganisation of Manipur/Tripura is not, hence unconstitutional.

E. Parliamentary Power Was Constitutionally Routed in J&K

Not so for Manipur/Tripura.

IX. COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL TABLE: J&K VS MANIPUR/TRIPURA

Before moving to the concluding analysis, it is necessary to address a common misconception: that the reorganisation of Jammu & Kashmir in 2019 provides a precedent for altering or bifurcating the territories of Manipur or Tripura. This assumption is constitutionally incorrect. The two situations arise from entirely different legal frameworks. The following comparative table demonstrates the fundamental differences in a clear and systematic manner.

The foregoing comparison demonstrates that the constitutional architecture of Jammu & Kashmir was uniquely grounded in Article 370, temporary autonomy, and a modifiable framework, whereas Manipur and Tripura are governed by merger covenants protected by Article 363 and basic structure limitations. Therefore, the reorganisation of J&K cannot provide any legal justification or precedent for the bifurcation or territorial alteration of Manipur or Tripura.

IX-A. Distinguishing Manipur and Tripura from Other Princely States that Were Later Reorganised

A frequent counterargument to the protection of Manipur and Tripura’s territorial integrity is the historical fact that several princely States—such as PEPSU, Vindhya Pradesh, Madhya Bharat, Saurashtra, Travancore–Cochin, Kutch, and others—were reorganised or merged into new administrative units during the 1950s and 1960s. This historical observation, however, does not constitute a constitutional precedent that applies to Manipur or Tripura. The legal and constitutional contexts are fundamentally different, and misunderstanding these distinctions risks producing incorrect constitutional conclusions. The following principles clarify why the earlier reorganisations do not weaken, and in fact strengthen, the argument for the constitutional inviolability of Manipur and Tripura.

A. Those Reorganised States Were Conglomerate Administrative Unions, Not Single Merger-Based Constitutional States

The princely States reorganised in the 1950s were not preserved as continuous constitutional entities after their accession. They were combined into new, composite units inside India, such as:

-- PEPSU (Patiala and East Punjab States Union), which combined 8 princely States

-- Madhya Bharat (a conglomeration of over 20 States)

-- Vindhya Pradesh (a union of 35 States)

-- Saurashtra (a union of nearly 200 States)

-- Travancore–Cochin (a fusion of two distinct States)

In each instance, the original princely States ceased to exist as autonomous constitutional identities after amalgamation.

By contrast:

-- Manipur was never merged into any larger administrative union.

-- Tripura was never merged into any composite entity.

Both remained continuous, undissolved constitutional States from accession to the present day.

Thus, their merger covenants remain operative, unlike the covenants of States absorbed into conglomerate units.

This distinction is constitutionally decisive.

B. Article 363 Was Never Triggered in Those Earlier Reorganisations

Reorganisation in the 1950s never involved disputes “arising out of or connected with” their individual merger agreements. The merger covenants of those princely States had already been submerged within newly created administrative unions inside India.

As a result:

-- No dispute touching the merger agreement existed.

-- No territorial alteration implicated the original covenant.

-- Article 363 did not apply, and therefore could not operate as a bar.

But for Manipur and Tripura:

Altering their boundaries directly implicates their Merger Agreements of 1949.

Such a dispute falls squarely within the Article 363 bar.

Parliament cannot legislate in a domain where the Constitution bars judicial review (Minerva Mills; Chandra Kumar).

Therefore, the historical reorganisations cannot be used to justify bifurcating Manipur or Tripura.

C. Manipur and Tripura are among the Very Few States Whose Territorial Identity Remains Exactly the Same as the Entity That Acceded

This makes them constitutionally unique.

Manipur:

-- Sovereign constitutional monarchy

-- Elected assembly (1947)

-- Merged as a single, identifiable State

-- Boundary at accession = boundary today

Tripura:

-- Sovereign princely State under Regency Council

-- Merged intact in 1949

-- Never absorbed into a larger political unit

This continuity means the territorial identity that merged into India still exists today, and any alteration would directly interfere with the historical compact protected under Article 363.

This situation did not apply to PEPSU, Madhya Bharat, Saurashtra, etc., whose identities were constitutionally dissolved.

D. Constitutional Principle: A Power that was not used in violation of Article 363 cannot become a precedent to violate Article 363 now

Even if one assumes that those past reorganisations were constitutionally questionable (though they were not), the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that:

Historical practice cannot override constitutional principle

(State of West Bengal v. Union of India; Bommai).

A flawed historical act cannot become a binding precedent to justify a future unconstitutional act.

Thus, even if political reorganisation occurred historically, that cannot justify violating the explicit constitutional bar of Article 363 in the present context.

E. Territorial Reorganisation of Manipur or Tripura Today Would Create an Unreviewable Legislative Field — Forbidden by the Basic Structure

If Parliament alters Manipur or Tripura’s boundaries:

The action directly implicates merger covenants

Courts are barred by Article 363

Parliament becomes unreviewable

Unreviewable power = violation of basic structure

(Minerva Mills; L. Chandra Kumar)

The Constitution never permits Parliament to act without judicial accountability.

Therefore, altering Manipur or Tripura would be structurally unconstitutional.

F. Integrated Principle for the Article

The historical reorganisation of certain post-accession conglomerate States does not weaken the constitutional protection available to Manipur and Tripura, because those reorganisations never engaged Article 363, nor did they involve the alteration of still-operative merger covenants. Manipur and Tripura acceded as intact, sovereign political entities whose territorial identities have remained unchanged since 1949. Any attempt to bifurcate or diminish them under Article 3 would directly implicate their merger agreements, trigger the Article 363 bar, violate federalism and constitutional morality, and result in the creation of unreviewable Parliamentary power — an outcome flatly prohibited by the basic structure doctrine.

IX-B. Article 3 Cannot Be Invoked to Reward Violence, Ethnic Mobilisation, or Constitutional Breakdown

A further constitutional limitation arises from the principle that Article 3 cannot be used as an instrument to reward violence, extra-constitutional mobilisation, or ethnically motivated demands, especially when a State is experiencing breakdown of constitutional order. The power under Article 3 is a structural authority, meant for legitimate federal reorganisation, not a political concession to coercive pressures. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that State action must conform to constitutional morality, the rule of law, and the basic structure, and cannot legitimise or incentivise unconstitutional behaviour (B.R. Kapur v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2001) 7 SCC 231; S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1). When a State is operating under conditions of violence, insurgency, ethnic conflict, or administrative collapse, the Union’s obligation is to restore constitutional governance, not to alter State boundaries as a response to coercive demands. To allow territorial reorganisation on the basis of violence or ethnic agitation would not only violate the basic structure principle of constitutional supremacy over political expediency, but would also erode federal trust, undermine democratic legitimacy, and create a dangerous precedent where the territorial integrity of States becomes contingent upon pressure rather than constitutional reason. Thus, Article 3 cannot be invoked as a political weapon or emergency tool to satisfy unrest; it remains bounded by constitutional norms that prohibit the State from validating or rewarding unconstitutional conduct.

X. DOCTRINAL SYNTHESIS: COMBINED EFFECT OF ARTICLE 3, ARTICLE 363, AND BASIC STRUCTURE

A. Merger Covenants Freeze Territorial Identity

The States became constitutional entities as they existed at merger.

B. Article 363 Limits Parliament’s Competence

Parliament cannot operate in prohibited zones.

C. Reorganisation Would Destroy Federal Trust

A violation of constitutional morality.

D. Article 3 Cannot Be Invoked

Whenever a State’s merger covenant is implicated, Article 363 defeats Article 3.

E. Even Constitutional Amendment Cannot Save Such Action

Because it violates basic structure.

CASE-LAW MATRIX TABLE (CLMT)

Mapping Each Constitutional Argument to its Supporting Supreme Court Judgments

XI. CONCLUSION

Manipur and Tripura stand among the few Indian States whose constitutional identities remain anchored in sovereign merger agreements. Their territorial integrity is not an administrative arrangement, but a constitutional promise safeguarded by Article 363 and reinforced by the basic structure doctrine. Any attempt to bifurcate, diminish, or reconfigure their territories would create disputes that courts cannot adjudicate, making such legislative action unaccountable and unconstitutional. The Constitution cannot permit Parliament to wield unreviewable power. Therefore, Article 3 cannot authorise the bifurcation or territorial alteration of Manipur or Tripura, nor can any constitutional amendment create such a power without violating fundamental constitutional principles.

The Constitution itself closes the door.