Interim Injunctions and the Prima Facie Test: Evolving Jurisprudence under Order 39 CPC

By

LAVANYA SINGH
BA LLB (Hons.) 2021-26

The interim injunction is a potent remedy in civil litigation[1]. It operates to preserve the subject matter of the suit or to prevent irreparable harm pending final adjudication. Among the triad of tests for granting an injunction—a prima facie case, irreparable injury, and balance of convenience—the prima facie case remains the most enigmatic and inconsistently applied[2]. The term “prima facie” literally means “at first glance,” yet in law, its definition has varied from “a serious question to be tried” to a “strong likelihood of success.”

In India, interim injunctions are governed under Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The courts, while exercising this power, have often laid down the requirement of establishing a prima facie case as a threshold standard. This requirement, while essential to prevent misuse of judicial process, has given rise to varying interpretations leading to unpredictability in outcomes. An injunction, by its nature, interferes with the rights of one party even before the conclusion of trial; thus, clarity in its guiding principles is indispensable.

The paper by Aditya Swarup titled “The Prima Facie Standard for Interim Injunctions in India” (2017) explores the varied interpretations of the term and critiques how Indian courts often deviate from doctrinal clarity. This article builds upon Swarup's insights, explores key case laws, and incorporates comparative elements from UK law, particularly the landmark judgment in American Cyanamid v. Ethicon. Additionally, this article incorporates judicial trends, empirical implications of mini-trials, and proposes practical reforms to enhance procedural efficiency.

•      What is the legal meaning and significance of a “prima facie” case in the context of interim injunctions in India?

•      How have Indian courts interpreted and applied this standard in various types of disputes?

•      What lessons can be drawn from the evolution of the standard in English law, particularly post-American Cyanamid?

•      How can Indian jurisprudence evolve to balance judicial economy with procedural justice while granting interlocutory relief?

•      To trace the historical and legal evolution of the concept of prima facie case in Indian and comparative jurisprudence.

•      To critically examine the inconsistency and flexibility in judicial interpretations of the standard.

•      To understand the impact of judicial delay and case backlog on the development of the “mini-trial” phenomenon in India.

•      To suggest a coherent framework for the consistent application of the standard in light of case management objectives.

Indian courts have offered multiple interpretations of what constitutes a “prima facie” case. These range from requiring only a “serious question to be tried” to insisting upon a “strong likelihood of success” or “clear entitlement” to relief.

•      Walker v Jones (1865) and Israil v Samser Rahman (1914 [3]) emphasized the need for bona fide contention and a fair question to be decided.

•      In Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh [(1992) 1 SCC 719][4] , the Supreme Court elaborated that a prima facie case does not imply that the plaintiff must succeed, but rather that a serious question must arise.

•      Shiv Kumar Chadha v. MCD [(1993) 3 SCC 161][5] reiterated that courts should not grant injunctions mechanically and that the threshold requirement of prima facie case must be accompanied by the other two criteria.

•      In Colgate Palmolive v. Hindustan Lever [(1999) 7 SCC 1][6], the Court shifted the discussion, recognizing that in certain commercial disputes, it may be necessary to look into the comparative strength of parties' cases.

More recent cases such as A. Gurudas v. Rasaranjan [(2006) 8 SCC 367] have clarified that courts may determine prima facie strength based on affidavits and preliminary documents.

Judicial Reasoning for Granting Interim Injunctions

Start --> Check Prima Facie Case --> If Yes --> Check Irreparable Injury --> If Yes --> Check Balance of Convenience --> If Yes --> Grant Injunction

The landmark case of American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. [1975] AC 396[7] laid down a simplified standard: that the plaintiff only needs to show a serious question to be tried. The purpose was to avoid protracted arguments on merits at the interim stage, thereby improving case management. This decision transformed the English legal approach to interlocutory injunctions and has since been cited with approval by Indian courts, although with variations.

United Kingdom Perspective:

The pre-American Cyanamid English practice often required plaintiffs to establish a probability of success, leading to extensive mini-trials. However, with American Cyanamid, the House of Lords streamlined the process by stating that courts should not attempt to resolve disputed facts at the interim stage. The only requirement was a “serious issue to be tried.”

Post-Cyanamid, this approach allowed for greater judicial efficiency, and interlocutory hearings focused on harm mitigation rather than merit resolution. However, this flexibility has not been without criticism. Scholars like Adrian Zuckerman argue that some cases warrant more intensive judicial scrutiny, especially when interim relief would effectively determine the case[8] .

Indian Perspective:

Although Cyanamid has been influential, Indian courts have adopted a hybrid approach. While some High Courts apply the “serious question” test, others require a “strong prima facie case,” particularly in intellectual property, real estate, and matrimonial disputes. For example, in trademark and copyright cases like SM Dyechem Ltd. v. Cadbury India Ltd. (2000) 5 SCC 573[9], courts have insisted on evaluating the comparative strength of claims.

The prima facie standard has long stood as the threshold test in the grant of interim injunctions, yet its elasticity has contributed to a great deal of judicial inconsistency and academic controversy. This section attempts to deconstruct the operational flaws of the standard in India and propose a structured critique that incorporates doctrinal reasoning, policy analysis, and lived realities within the justice system.

At its core, the prima facie standard is intended to ensure that judicial time and equitable relief are not expended on frivolous claims. However, the standard’s lack of precise definition has allowed judges to interpret it based on personal jurisprudential philosophies or case-specific pressures, leading to a wide divergence in application. A prima facie case could mean merely a ‘serious question to be tried’ or it could imply a ‘strong likelihood of success.’ This definitional latitude allows for subjective and at times arbitrary decision-making.

In my observation, one of the major practical implications of this vagueness is the phenomenon of “mini-trials” during interim hearings. Especially in High Courts such as Delhi and Bombay, hearings on interim injunctions often mirror final hearings [10]. Judges hear extensive arguments, peruse large volumes of documents, and often pass detailed orders resembling judgments. This situation is particularly prevalent in commercial and intellectual property disputes where litigants are aware that a favorable interim injunction—especially one lasting several years due to pendency—can give them a de facto victory.

This undermines both procedural fairness and judicial economy. Interim injunctions are supposed to be interlocutory and neutral; however, in practice they often alter the playing field so drastically that the final outcome becomes irrelevant. This is not merely an academic concern but one that shapes litigation strategies in the real world. For example, in patent disputes, an interim injunction can halt a product launch, affect a company’s stock prices, and stifle innovation regardless of the final adjudication. The chilling effect on market competition and technological progress is thus very real.

In one instance that I came across while attending a hearing at the Bombay High Court, a start-up was barred from selling a product due to an alleged patent violation by a multinational corporation. Despite the start-up having a seemingly valid counterclaim and evidence of independent development, the court passed an interim injunction order that lasted for almost two years. Eventually, the plaintiff withdrew the suit, but the damage was already done. This demonstrates how an unbalanced prima facie standard, if interpreted too rigidly, can lead to the miscarriage of justice[11].

This problem is compounded by the uneven application of the standard across different jurisdictions. For instance, the Delhi High Court is known for favoring rights holders in IPR disputes, while the Madras High Court adopts a more cautious and equitable approach. This lack of uniformity fosters forum shopping and further erodes public trust in the judiciary. A litigant should not have to factor in geography while assessing legal merit, but this is often the case due to doctrinal inconsistency[12].

Another issue is that judges, in trying to avoid reversals in appellate courts, are incentivized to write overly detailed interim orders. The fear of being overturned on appeal can pressure judges to err on the side of caution, granting interim injunctions even when the prima facie threshold is thinly met. This is especially visible in politically sensitive matters or in high-value commercial suits.

A doctrinal reformation of the prima facie standard is certainly necessary. It is my argument that we must move away from a blanket conception towards a more graduated model. For instance, the Supreme Court or Law Commission may set up a gradation system where the level of scrutiny needed at the interim stage depends on the character of the invoked right and the nature of the dispute. A graduated standard would help strike a balance between the dictates of fairness and the need for flexibility.

In addition, the role of socio-economic forces in shaping access to interim relief also deserves close attention. Wealthy litigants have the financial ability to procure competent documentation and skilled legal advice, which allows them to advance a 'strong' prima facie case. Marginal litigants, on the other hand, tend not to obtain interim relief, despite the merit of their case, because of a lack of legal expertise. Such procedural asymmetry requires a more equitable interpretation of the standard, which continues to be responsive to the reality experience of the litigant group.

A procedural innovation that deserves attention is the use of 'injunction bonds,' as found in American law. Here, a party seeking an injunction must post a bond that pays the defendant if the injunction is found to have been granted improperly. This requirement discourages frivolous petitions and adds a new layer of accountability to the injunction process.

Judicial academies also have a crucial part to play. Formal programmatic training must be offered to teach young judges not only the doctrinal development of the prima facie test but also the economic, social, and strategic ramifications of it. An educated judiciary will be able to apply the standard more appropriately judiciously without undue overreaching or insufficient underreaching.

Lastly, there is a necessity to acknowledge the potential of technology to simplify the process of adjudication of interim relief. Artificial intelligence tools can assist judges in sifting through precedents, analyzing risk factors, and creating case summaries. Although technology cannot substitute judicial discretion, it can facilitate uniform and prompt decision-making, especially in cases of ordinary injunctions.

In short, the prima facie standard is the linchpin of interim relief judicial gatekeeping. Its application in Indian courts today is, however, raising concerns about uniformity, equity, and strategic abuse. A doctrinal realignment, coupled with institutional reforms and policy innovations, is necessary to reassert the integrity of the interim injunction system. As a research student and scholar, I strongly advocate for a reasoned but realistic approach—a synthesis of legal doctrine and socio-economic realities to administer justice in both form and substance.

In a legal research document, a conclusion bears no relevance at all, yet it is the most important aspect of this work - where the vision is born out of insight: illuminating detail's beauty. After cutting through the labyrinth of caselaw, doctrines, policy considerations, and comparative analysis, it is clear that the “standard” of a prima facie case for interim injunctions in India is at once basic and brittle. It is basic because it prescribes the level of a gatekeeper to one of the most potent weapons in civil procedure - access; it is brittle due to the absence of structural coherence that pulls the primordial foundations to shambolic shreds.

In my view, the ebb and flow of the ‘serious question’ and the ‘strong case’ test within jurisdictions is astonishing and, more often than not, intertwined with the indecipherable psyche of the judiciary. The case is no longer an academic riddle. It is a judge trying to react to congested court dockets operating in a litigation culture and philosophy with so many variants, each more vexing than the last.

I have seen orders where two courts, faced with nearly identical facts, reached opposite conclusions simply because of the interpretive elasticity of “prima facie.” This isn’t merely a legal aberration—it is a systemic signal for reform. My observation is that many injunction orders, especially ex parte, are passed in haste, almost as a procedural tick-box, often without appreciating the long-term socio-economic impact. On the flip side, there are cases where the court overanalyzes facts and submissions at the interim stage, essentially delivering what feels like a final judgment. This schizophrenia in approach—either casual or hyper-intensive— reveals the need for recalibration.

Moreover, injunction jurisprudence has taken on disproportionate weight in litigation strategy. Litigants treat the interim phase not as a prelude to justice but as a substitute. In IPR disputes, a patent owner may never need to prove infringement in court if they secure a timely interim injunction; in land disputes, an interim stay can effectively paralyze development for years. These are not isolated episodes; they form a pattern of judicial behavior and litigant expectation that, while legally permissible, often skews substantive justice.

Therefore, India needs not only clarity but courage: the courage to standardize without oversimplifying, to innovate without ignoring due process, and to contextualize law within its socio-economic ecosystem. The prima facie standard must evolve beyond its Anglo-Saxon inheritance to become uniquely Indian in its pragmatism.

Strategic Suggestions with Rationale:

1.    Tiered Approach to Prima Facie: Courts should employ a tiered threshold based on the type of right invoked. For example, economic rights (e.g., contract enforcement) may require a moderate prima facie showing, while fundamental rights or public interest litigation can suffice with a mere serious question.

2.    Standardized Judicial Checklists: A judicial toolkit—akin to sentencing guidelines—can include a checklist for interim injunctions to ensure all three conditions (prima facie case, irreparable harm, and balance of convenience) are analyzed with equal vigor. This would ensure judicial discipline and mitigate bias.

3.    Mandatory Returnable Dates in Ex Parte Orders: No ex parte injunction should be valid beyond a fixed short period (e.g., 7 days) without hearing the opposite party. Currently, many such orders linger for months.

4.    Economic Impact Disclosures: Litigants seeking injunctions in commercial disputes should be required to disclose estimated financial impact (on both sides) to help courts assess balance of convenience more transparently.

5.    Prima Facie Indexing in Judgments: Courts may be encouraged to state not just that a prima facie case exists, but the degree to which it does (e.g., weak, moderate, strong). This nuanced articulation aids appellate courts, prevents overreliance, and creates better jurisprudential records.

6.    Real-Time Judicial Training Modules: Judicial academies must adopt quarterly training sessions on interim relief jurisprudence that reflect new judgments, international best practices, and empirical data on outcomes.

7.    Empirical Research and Audits: The National Judicial Data Grid (NJDG) or Law Commission should periodically audit interim injunction orders to assess their lifespan, reversal rate, and final outcome correlation. Data-backed reform is more persuasive and precise.

8.    Use of Artificial Intelligence: AI-assisted tools should be explored (with appropriate ethical safeguards) to assess precedent, flag contradictory rulings, and guide judges with comparative analyses on injunction jurisprudence.

Personal Insight:

As a student researcher and someone who has closely observed trial courts and High Court hearings, I am constantly struck by how procedural discretion can shape economic destiny. I’ve seen start-ups collapse due to interim injunctions, not because they were legally wrong, but because they lacked the resources to battle a drawn-out litigation. Conversely, I’ve seen unscrupulous litigants exploit ambiguity to game the system. That’s when law, in all its nobility, turns into a tool of oppression.

Injunctions are not just about law—they’re about lives, livelihoods, and legacies. They must be wielded with care, crafted with clarity, and subjected to scrutiny. The prima facie standard is no longer just a gatekeeper; in many ways, it is the gate itself.

1.    Aditya Swarup, “The Prima Facie Standard for Interim Injunctions in India,” (2017) 4 NLUD Stud LJ 20.

2.    American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 (HL).

3.    Dalpat Kumar v Prahlad Singh (1992) 1 SCC 719.

4.    Shiv Kumar Chadha v MCD (1993) 3 SCC 161.

5.    Colgate Palmolive v Hindustan Lever (1999) 7 SCC 1.

6.    SM Dyechem Ltd v Cadbury India Ltd (2000) 5 SCC 573.

7.    A Gurudas v Rasaranjan (2006) 8 SCC 367.

8.    Black's Law Dictionary (10th Edn., West Publishing).

9.    Zuckerman on Civil Procedure: Principles and Practice (3rd Edn).

10.  Adrian Zuckerman, “Interim Injunctions on the Merits” (1991) 107 LQR 196.

11.  Indian Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.