FEMALE COPARCENARY

Hindu women's right to property in a Hindu joint family has its own long-drawn history, which has evolved over a period of time. The coparcenary system in the Mitakshara Hindu Joint Family had been very patriarchal as it specifically pertained to the male members of the family who had the ownership of the joint family property or the coparcenary property. Women's incapacity to offer spiritual ministrations and their ineligibility to fulfil their father's pind daan (pious obligation), was primarily the reason why women were denied the right to coparcenary property and were given the bare minimum rights of residence and maintenance. The ownership of the property was thus only in the hands of the male members of the family.

While the rights in the coparcenary property came to the forefront and came to be crystallized by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act of 2005¹, the idea originated in an extremely discreet form in Section 19 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act², which on its face simply seems to be a welfare-oriented provision for those women who are unable to maintain themselves on the death of their husbands. However, a deeper understanding of this provision brought to the forefront a tussle between women's rights and coparcenary property. Section 19 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 provides that “A Hindu wife, whether married before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be entitled to be maintained after the death of her husband by her father-in-law”³, and this obligation is maintainable only by the shares in the coparcenary property. Thus, it is quite prominent that even a widow has an indirect share in her deceased husband's coparcenary property and is entitled to be maintained by the same. This was codified for the very first time by the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. It is also further explained in the section and was held in the case of Raj Kishore Mishra v Meena Mishra⁴, by the Allahabad HC which decided that right of widows to claim maintenance from their father in laws would arise only if the widow is unable to maintain herself from the estate of her husband, her parents or her children. Similarly, it was held by the Madras High Court in the case of Animuthu v. Gandhimmal⁵ that the liability of the father-in-law comes to an end when the widow is remarried or she has obtained a share in the coparcenary properties during partition. But her right to a share in the separate property of her husband or in his interest in coparcenary property cannot be divested.

On the other hand, the Dayabhaga school of law was more progressive in terms of the equal treatment of all heirs of the predeceased coparcener regardless of their gender. In the Mitakshara school of law, there was a unity of possession and community of interest which would devolve based on the doctrine of survivorship thereby ensuring that the shares of neither of the sons were determined until the partition was executed and interest by birth remained restricted to the lineal male descendants up to the third degree. However, the concept of coparcenary as has been applied in the Mitakshara school of law where everyone has an interest by birth is not the same as the Dayabhaga school of law where a person gets an absolute right in the property. In Dayabhaga school of law, coparcenary property would devolve only on the death of the previous coparcener by the means of inheritance, thereby ensuring that each of the heirs irrespective of his/her gender was a co-owner of the property. This ensured that there was no imbalance between the various branches within a Hindu Joint Family during the devolution of the property by virtue of the concentration of a larger number of male heirs in one branch as opposed to the other and thereby avoided any discrimination in the sharing of the property by virtue of having a girl child. As every member of the family is entitled to a share in the joint family property as a co-owner in a Dayabhaga family, a woman in the family is also given the right to co-own the property. However, in the case of a woman born in a Mitakshara joint family, until 2005, she only had the right to be maintained and had no share in the joint family property. Thus, the rights of women differed based on the branch of Hindu joint family that they were born in. This explains the inherent discrimination that women faced, not just by virtue of gender, but due to the difference in the schools of law that applies to their families.

Succession was a subject which was a part of the concurrent list, and as a result of this, several states amended provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 to ensure that women also enjoyed coparcenary rights in line with their male counterparts. It was in 1975, that Kerala abolished the joint family property and ensured that succession went by inheritance to both men and women rather than granting joint property ownership only to men⁶. States such as Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu took a more reformist approach. State amendments to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 among these states were enacted to grant daughters coparcenary rights equivalent to those of the sons and to abolish the dowry system through positive empowerment steps. This advantage, however, was strictly for daughters who were unmarried when the amendment came into force; the daughter's eventual marriage did not strip her of the property rights that had already been vested in her.

While the states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu recognized the right of those women who were unmarried when the amendment came into force, there were states such as Uttar Pradesh⁷ that continued to deny women coparcenary rights while recognizing their interest in the joint family property by virtue of Section 3(2) of Hindu Women's Right to Property Act 1937⁸. However, the infirmity of the state enactments of the mentioned states was the exclusion of the right to coparcenary property of women, who were married prior to the commencement of the respective state amendment acts, while, the aforementioned right was available to a woman who got married after the commencement of such Acts. This led to a scenario where some women were granted the right to coparcenary within a joint family, while the others were denied the same based on the state that they resided in, thereby creating a different set of rules for women hailing from different states.

Several Supreme Court judgments such as those which had been laid down in the cases of Savita Samvedi v. Union of India⁹ held that the distinction between a married and an unmarried daughter with respect to coparcenary rights may be unconstitutional. In the case of Narasimaha Murthy v. Sushilabai¹⁰ it was held by the Supreme Court with reference to section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, that even when a sole surviving male heir in the joint family is alive, alongside a female heir, the female heir does not have the right to claim partition of the dwelling house of a dying intestate, unless the male sole surviving coparcener decides to separate his own share or ceases to occupy it or lets it out¹¹. It was on this basis that the 174th Law Commission Report recommended doing away with some of these gender-based inequalities which were present in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and had been conflicting with the fundamental rights which are provided by the Constitution of India¹², and thereby amend the act in a manner that did not disadvantage women on the grounds of gender¹³. This was the reason and objective behind the introduction of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Bill, 2000 which after deliberation was passed as the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005.

The Bill proposed to remove the discriminatory provisions of the Hindu Succession Act 1965, which, under section 6, recognized only male members of the family as coparceners, and in case there was a female member alive in the family at the time of the death of the deceased coparcener, the joint family property would not be passed on by the doctrine of survivorship, as would have happened otherwise, but instead through inheritance¹⁴. The Bill proposed to remove this inherent discrimination by amending the section and providing that even daughters are coparceners in a Hindu joint family by birth, and have the same rights and share in the coparcenary property as those of a son. The bill also proposed to remove other discriminatory sections such as section 23 and 24 that did not give a woman the right to ask for partition, unless a male member asks for it¹⁵.

Most parliamentarians were in favour of the provisions that were proposed by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Bill, 2000, but were of the opinion that while this bill proposed to do away with the gender bias that was present in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, it had the potential to open the floodgates of litigation and affect issues such as the fragmentation of agricultural land holdings¹⁶. However, despite looking for an immediate answer to the various issues that the act was likely to raise in the future, the bill was passed in 2005. While the 2005 Amendment Act provided coparcenary rights to women by amending section 6 and repealing several discriminatory sections 4(2), 23, and 24 there were still various obstructions and hindrances which were created by the various interpretations which had been adopted by various High Courts while adjudicating such cases. While the amended section 6 of the Act provides that this right of a woman to get a share in the joint family property would not affect the partitions and alienations that have taken place before 20th December 2004¹⁷, there have been several different interpretations of the courts with regards to the application of this section depending on whether the woman was born before/after the amendment or if the father had died before/after the passage of the amendment.

The passage of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 rendered inoperative all those state amendments which were conflicting with the amendment passed by the central government, which would prevail to the extent of the inconsistency. However, the situation in Kerala was slightly different. The state of Kerala had passed the Kerala Joint Family System (Abolition) Act of 1975¹⁸, which had abolished the concept of joint family property and the concept of right by birth in the family estate. It was on this basis that the High Court of Kerala in the case of Kali Ammal v Valiyammal¹⁹ held that on the date of the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 no joint family system existed in Kerala as it had been abolished in 1975 and since no joint family system was prevailing, there could be no claim of right by birth by anyone.

Despite having introduced an amendment that was to apply uniformly across the territory of India, several high courts interpreted the amended sections in a very different manner, thereby continuing to create disparity among women from different states. In the case of Prithviraj v Neelamma²⁰, it was held by the Karnataka High Court that the amended provisions of the section would apply only if the previous coparcener was alive during the commencement of the Amendment Act of 2005²¹. This court thus interpreted the law to have prospective application as it was only the law on the date of opening of the succession which was to apply. However, in the case of Badrinarayan Shankar Bhandari v Omprakash Shankar Bhandari²², the Bombay High Court took a view contrary to that of the Karnataka High Court and held that while section 6(1)(a) of the Amendment Act would be prospectively applied, Section 6(1)(b), Section 6(1)(c) and Section 6(2) of The Hindu Succession Act 2005, would be retroactively applied. This meant that irrespective of the date of birth of the woman, the amended section 6 would apply to her as long as she was alive on the date of the passage of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. This interpretation came closest to that which was given by the Supreme Court in the case of Vineeta Sharma v Rakesh Sharma²³ which also interpreted section 6 of the amended act to apply retroactively rather than prospectively or retrospectively, which is explained further in the article.

The Supreme Court in the case of Prakash v Phulavati²⁴ (2015) upheld the decisions that had been delivered in the past by upholding the appeal and held that the text of the Amendment Act as has been mentioned in section 6(1) and 6(3) of the Hindu Succession Act, 2005 had to be construed in an ordinary sense and the argument that since the amendment was a piece of social legislation it could be applied retrospectively could not be upheld as the retrospective application of the act had not been mentioned explicitly and thus could not be the implied intention of the legislature. It thereby held that the rights under the amendment were applicable to living daughters of living coparceners on the 9th September 2005, regardless of what day the daughter was born. It also held that all partitions and alienations which had taken place before 20th December 2004 were valid and could not be reopened as even statutory notional partitions were legally enforceable as the rights of the heirs get crystallized even if the partition is not executed by metes and bounds. The judgment delivered in the Phulavati case was also upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of Danamma @ Suman Surpur vs Amar²⁵ (2018) wherein it upheld the retrospective application of the Amendment Act but extended its application to the cases involving partition and so on that had been initiated before the enactment but were pending before the courts on the 9th September 2005.

These differing stances of the courts with regards to the interpretation of the amendment and its intention was cleared by the Supreme court in the case of Vineeta Sharma v Rakesh Sharma²⁶, in 2020. The court opined that the objective of the amendment was to remove the gender discrimination that the Act of 1956 had brought out with it, and the application of the amendment is to be done with the same objective. While the amended section 6²⁷ does say that there will be no retrospective effect of the inclusion of a woman in coparcenary to partitions and alienations that have been effected before 2005, this retrospective application only pertains to those cases where the partition has taken place, and not to those where the woman was born or where the father died, and thus, this is a retroactive application. The two conditions which now have to be satisfied with the retroactive application of the Amendment Act are that the women must have been born and should be alive when the Amendment Act of 2005 was passed. The right of a woman to be a coparcener is given to her by birth and does not get affected by the death of a previous coparcener/father and neither does the coparcenary change or come to an end in any way. Thus, the coparcener, from whom the daughter is inheriting by virtue of her being coparcener, need not be alive as on the commencement of the Amendment Act of 2005.

While the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 did away with those provisions that were promoting a gender bias and thereby conflicting with the provisions of the Indian Constitution, the guarantees and the benefits that this act aimed to bestow continue to remain very uncertain as the courts, in the span of 15 years, have interpreted the act very differently in different instances, which is visible by the stark contrast in the interpretations adopted by the courts in the case of Prakash v Phulavati²⁸ and Vineeta Sharma v Rakesh Sharma²⁹. With the rights having been made available to women, their ability to seek the right of maintenance under section 19³⁰ of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act has weakened considerably, as some women now legally have coparcenary property and means to maintain themselves, thereby releasing the members of the marital home from being responsible for their maintenance. So while a woman is still stuck in the lengthy litigation for the determination of her share in the coparcenary property of her father's joint family, which continues to remain disputed for long, her husband or father – in-law, who were required to maintain her, use the presence of coparcenary property of her father's family as an excuse to deny maintaining her. This denial can be justified based on the provisions of section 25 of Hindu Marriage Act and section 18 and 19 of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, which provide that maintenance is to be given to a wife/widow by the husband or the father-in-law only in case the woman is unable to maintain herself through her own or her father's estate or property, which includes her share in the coparcenary property.

While we have come a long way from the point where women were given a meagre right of residence and maintenance till a place where women are now coparceners by birth in their own right and are entitled to the same rights as those of a son, the consequences of the Vineeta Sharma v Rakesh Sharma³¹ case are yet to be observed. However, it can be said with utmost certainty that the Amendment Act of 2005, and the progressions in it that have been brought about by the Honourable court in the case of Vineeta Sharma v Rakesh Sharma³², have aimed to remove gender discrimination in a Hindu Joint family, at all levels. Subsequently, males and females are now seen at the same threshold and are given the same rights as one another. However, there are a few conflicts between the provisions and the implementation of these statutes, and only judicial interpretations overtime will give us a fair idea whether the purpose and intent of these welfare legislations are being fulfilled with regards to the benefit of the stakeholders of these acts i.e. women.

The authors are of the opinion that the interpretation of the various provisions involving the determination of the amount of maintenance that is to be granted to a spouse such as Section 19 of The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 and Section 25 of The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, should be done in a harmonious manner along with the provisions of The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 and the interpretation of the respective statutes with respect to their application, needs to be done in a way for the attainment of their essence. The golden rule of interpretation should be applied so as to ensure that the potential for misuse does not disadvantage the women for whose benefit these legislations were passed. The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 granted women coparcenary rights in the same sense as those that were granted to men and thus for all purposes such a right would be included within the ambit of a women's property or her independent source of income. Having said this, it is important to note that with the amendment in The Hindu Succession Act, 1956, a woman has now been granted an absolute right in the joint family property of her father, but her share in the coparcenary property remains fluctuating and variable until a partition is affected. Further, the Indian courts have adopted various interpretations while adjudicating matters related to The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, and these have been evolving even fifteen years after the passage of the Amendment Act as has been seen in the case of Vineeta Sharma v Rakesh Sharma³³. Under such a scenario, extending the meaning of property to include such an undefined share in the coparcenary property while deciding the quantum of maintenance under The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 is likely to be used as an escape from maintaining her in accordance with his standard of living by her husband. While coparcenary property of a Hindu joint family may be included in the calculation of income tax, and the consequent income tax returns, it should be excluded while calculating the quantum of maintenance to be granted under various sections of the several statutes that have been mentioned above. The primary reason behind this is that provisions dealing with the income from house property, such as sections 22³⁴, 23³⁵ and 26³⁶ of the Income Tax Act³⁷ are based on the precondition that the share of an individual is defined and ascertainable. The shares within the coparcenary property are fluid and undefined until partition is affected. Further, while determining the quantum of maintenance that is to be paid to the spouse, one needs to submit one's income tax returns, which includes an account of such coparcenary property and the notional income which may flow from it and may be used to enhance the quantum of maintenance to the disadvantage of the other spouse and thus, its exclusion while calculating the maintenance would be a fairer method of calculating maintenance.

The authors would like to elaborate on this by highlighting the various scenarios that are likely to arise in light of such interpretations. These are the probable exceptional situations which may arise which the judiciary will have to interpret, taking into consideration the various statutory provisions.

1. When the wife has no independent source of income but is a coparcener in her father's joint family

a. When the husband is richer than the wife

If the husband's income (y) is Rs.50 and the wife's income from the coparcenary property (x1) is Rs.20, and her independent source of income (x) is Rs.0, then we can safely say that x1+x<y.

I. Here, if the coparcenary property of the wife is included in the ambit of “property” as under of The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, or section 25 of The Hindu Marriage Act,] depending on the value of her separate income and the coparcenary property, she can be said to maintain herself to some extent.

Thus, If the coparcenary property is included in the calculation of the maintenance, in this scenario the standard of living of the couple was Rs.70, and thus the husband may have to maintain the wife for the value of Rs.35 (half of the value of the standard of living of the couple). She may thus have to be maintained for the value of (35-20) i.e., Rs.15.

II. However, in a scenario where the wife's coparcenary property is excluded from the total property of wife, then for the purpose of calculation of maintenance (x<y), the standard of living of husband would be Rs.50, and thus the wife may have to be provided for to the extent of Rs.25 (half of the the standard of living of the couple). Since coparcenary property is not included in the calculation of husband may have to maintain her to the extent of (25-0), i.e., Rs.25.

From this illustration, it is evident that if the wife comes from a rich family, the husband may escape from the responsibility of maintaining his wife to the extent of (25-15) Rs.10. If the wife's coparcenary property (x1) which in this case is variable, is excluded from the calculation of maintenance, each man irrespective of his wife's family background may have to maintain her to the same extent. However, if the coparcenary property is included within the ambit of property and thereby included in the calculation of maintenance, it may create a gap among men whereby the responsibility of those married to women hailing from rich families might be diminished in relation to those married to women coming from a poor familial background. In an age where for some miscreants, marriage may have lost its sanctity and may have become a money-making business, this difference might promote social evils such as increasing the inclination to marry rich women with the objective of getting away from the responsibilities of maintenance.

b. When the husband is poorer than the wife.

If the husband's income (y) is Rs.50, the wife's independent source of income (x) is Rs.20, and her income from the coparcenary property (x1) is Rs.50, then we can safely say that x+x1>y.

I. In a case where the wife's property is included in the definition of “property”, she may be considered to be in a position to maintain herself, and her husband as well. In this scenario, as per the living standards of the couple (Rs.120), the husband might have to be maintained to the extent of Rs.60 (half of the value of the standard of living of the couple). Thus, the wife being richer than the husband, she may have to maintain him to the extent of (60-50) i.e., Rs.10. This may become a cause of action under section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for the husband to swindle his wife's coparcenary property in the form of maintenance, even if her independent source of income is lesser than his.

II. In a case where the wife's coparcenary property is excluded from the definition of “property” as under the provisions of maintenance under the various statutes, then (x<y). In this instance, the standard of living of the couple would be Rs.70, and since the wife's independent source of income is lesser than that of her husband, she might have to be maintained to the standard of Rs.35 (half of the value of the standard of living of the couple). The husband in this scenario may have to maintain her to the extent of (35-20), i.e., Rs.15. If coparcenary property is excluded from the definition of “property” for the calculation of maintenance under the provisions of the several statutes, it might ensure that the coparcenary property does not become a means through which the husband can swindle his wife who hails from a rich background. This may discourage those people who get married with the sole intent of swindling the wife who hails from a rich background in the form of maintenance. The downside to excluding coparcenary property would be that the husband being poor, may still have to maintain the wife in accordance with his own status and may be pressurised into paying alimony to his wife who has enough to her name in the form of her coparcenary property.

Maintenance Chart

Plotting the points of the various instances of the property of husband varying with the property of their wives and the alimony that they eventually have to pay, we observe the above graph. Here, the blue line represents the property of the husband, which is kept constant at 50 for the ease of comparison and understanding, and the green line and the yellow line represent the value of the wife's property that is used in the calculation of maintenance, and the value of maintenance respectively. Throughout the graph, we see an inverse relationship between the property of the wife and the alimony that is to be paid to her. It is also observed that as long as the property of the wife is less than that of the husband (green line is below the blue line), the husband is required to pay maintenance to her. However, as the value of the wife's property exceeds that of the husband, maintenance is to be given by the wife to the husband, and thus, the yellow lines reaches (-10). Here, the negative sign of the value of maintenance attributes to the fact that alimony is then paid from the wife to the husband, instead of the other way around, which has been depicted by a positive sign everywhere else on the graph.

Further, it is observed that in the first and the third conditions (points), i.e., when the Coparcenary property of the wife is included in the calculation of her property, the maintenance that the husband is required to pay to the wife is lesser as compared to the second and the fourth conditions (points), in which the Coparcenary property is excluded.

Thus, this substantiates the initial observation of the authors that the inclusion of the Coparcenary property of the wife in the definition of her property for the purposes of calculation of maintenance, can be used by the husbands as an excuse to diminish their obligations to pay maintenance to the wives.

Another important observation is when the green line intersects with the blue line, at (y=50), i.e. when the values of the properties of the two spouses are equal, the yellow line intersects the x-axis at the same vertical axis as that of the intersection of the green and blue lines. This explains that when the values of the properties of the spouses are equal, no maintenance is to be paid by either spouse to the other.

It is important to note here, that this is a mathematical approach to the calculation of maintenance, but in practical application, depending on the facts and circumstances of the cases, the courts might increase/decrease the value of maintenance that is to be paid by either of the spouses. The next section further explains how the values of maintenance varies with the application and interpretation of different statutes

2. Differing alimony under various statutes

a. If we were to look at the manner in which the provisions of The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (section 125³⁸), and The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (section 20³⁹) have been constructed, it becomes clear that the responsibility on the husband to maintain his wife is greater. Here, the provisions do not explicitly mention the scope of value of the maintenance that the husband may be required to give to the wife. The limit of the 'ability of the wife to maintain herself is not provided in the sections and thus, the court can interpret these sections in a broader way to order the husband to give maintenance to the wife even if she has all the means to maintain herself. This was also held by the Bombay High court in the case of Sanjay Damodar Kale v. Kalyani Sanjay Kale⁴⁰, and by the Supreme Court in the case of Sunita Kachwa v Anil Kachwa⁴¹, that just the fact that the wife had a considerable source of income, cannot be used as a ground to reject her claim for maintenance.

Further, while explaining the variation in the scope of section 20 of The Protection of Women from Domestic violence Act being much wider than that or Section 125 CrPC, it was observed in the case of Shome Nikhil Danani v. Tanya Banon Danani⁴² by the Delhi High Court, that, “While Section 125 CrPC talks only of maintenance, Section 20 DV Act stipulates payment of monetary relief to meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered as a result of the domestic violence including but not limited to loss of earning, medical expenses, loss caused due to destruction, damage or removal of any property from the control of aggrieved person.”

b. In case the couple gets married under the Special Marriage Act, then as under section 37, there being mention of property or independent source of income as being a metric that determines the amount be granted as maintenance, the husband is to provide maintenance and support to his wife. The language of The Special Marriage Act uses the words 'maintain' and 'support' which are interpreted in broader sense so as to encompass “all such means of living that would enable one to live in degree of comfort suitable and becoming to his station of life”⁴³, as compared to The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 which provides maintenance only when the wife is 'unable to maintain herself.

c. Under The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 (sections 18, 19), a husband is to maintain wife only if she is 'unable to maintain herself. This takes into account the various scenarios that been explained in the previous examples, with regards to the value of the total property of the w compared to that of the husband.

d. Section 24⁴⁴ and Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act have made use of different criteria constructing the definition of property and income. While Section 25 mentions 'other property' calculating the maintenance of either spouse, this condition is absent while determining the maintenance to be provided pendente lite. This difference in the construction of section 24 and section 25 o Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 should be constructed in a manner that is harmonious with the way the author proposes to apply section 25. This means that while calculating the 'other property' under section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the 'other property' should exclude coparcenary property, without which this provision can become a means of mischief through which miscreants may find means to deny their wives maintenance by shielding themselves with their wives' coparcenary property. Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 provides for maintenance to be given by one spouse to the other based on who requires it, and after calculating the value of the property or income or either spouses and the differences between them, as explained previously. In this scenario, the husband can actively pursue for maintenance from his wife's coparcenary property, unlike under the other provisions where he can at most defend his case for denying to maintain his wife in light of her coparcenary property.

The various statutory provisions along with the amended act should be constructed in a harmonious manner to ensure that the gap between the law and the actual application of it does not become a reason to disadvantage the women for whose welfare they were enacted in the first place. How these provisions would be interpreted in the future is dependent on how the judiciary interprets these provisions in such disputes, and only time will tell the consequences of such acts.

Research Assistants

Aditi Nazre, II year law student at NALSAR University of Law

Shalika, II year law student at NALSAR University of Law

By :

SHIV SHANKAR BANERJEE,

Advocate, Supreme Court of India

Co-author- Divyastuti,

Advocate and Partner, Parsoons Legal Solutions

___________________________________________________________________________

1. The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956.

2. The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956 §19.

3. Raj Kishore Mishra v. Meena Mishra, AIR 1995 All 70.

4. Animuthu v Gandhimmal, AIR 1977 Mad 372.

5. The Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act 1975. (Act 30 Of 1976).

6. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raja Yadavendra Dutta Dubey Of Jaunpur, (1964) 53 ITR 770.

7. Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 § 3 cl.2.

8. Savita Samvedi v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 380.

9. Narasimaha Murthy v. Sushilabai, (1996) 3 SCC 644.

10. The Hindu Succession Act 1956 §23.

11. 12 INDIAN CONST, art 15.

12. 174th Report, Law Commission of India 2000.

13. The Hindu Succession Act 1956 §6.

14. The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act 2005 § 23.

15. Lok Sabha, 29th August 2005, The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Bill, 2005: LOK SABHA DEBATE (India).

16. The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act 2005 § 6 cl. 1.

17. supra note 6 at 3.

18. Kali Ammal v. Valliyammal, (2016)4 KLT 903.

19. M. Prithviraj and Ors v. Smt. Leelamma N. and Ors., ILR 2009 Kar 3612.

20. supra note 1 at 1.

21. Badrinarayan Shankar Bhandari v. Om Prakash Shankar Bhandari, AIR 2014 Bom 151.

22. Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma and Ors., 2020 SCC OnLine SC 641.

23. Prakash v. Phulavati, (2016) 2 SCC 36.

24. Danamma @ Suman Surpur v. Amar, (2018) 3 SCC 343.

25. supra note 22 at 5.

26. The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 § 6.

27. supra note 24 at 6.

28. supra note 22 at 5.

29. supra note 3 at 1.

30. supra note 22 at 5.

31. Id.

32. Id.

33. The Income-Tax Act 1995 § 22.

34. The Income-Tax Act 1995 § 23.

35. The Income-Tax Act 1995 § 26.

36. The Income-Tax Act 1995.

37. The Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 § 125.

38. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005 § 20.

39. Sanjay Damodar Kale v. Kalyani Sanjay Kale (2020) 2 AIR Bom R (Cri) 395.

40. Sunita Kachwa v. Anil Kachwa (2014) 16 SCC 715.

41. Shome Nikhil Danani v. Tanya Banon Danani, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 8016.

42. Rajesh Burman v. Mitul Chatterjee, (2009) 1 SCC 398.

43. The Hindu Marriage Act 1955 § 24.

Disclaimer :  Facts and Opinions in this article are solely the personal statements of the Author. Publishers are no way responsible or liable to the readers for any errors or omissions and actions taken by readers by relying upon this article.